Newropeans Magazine - Paris, France
Moldova is a small land-locked part of Europe, reportedly the poorest country on our continent. It is also an interesting place to observe the continued and enormous magnetic pull that the European Union exerts on its neighbours. It is also a warning that once expectations have been generated, the EU had better be careful what it does next: Revolutions do not happen when people are poor and downtrodden, they happen when expectations have been raised and are then dashed.
A recent visit
In Chisinau airport, most officials seem to speak Russian, even though the majority of the population speaks Romanian. Interestingly hostility between the two groups seems limited in the capital, and that despite the legacy of Soviet times where for instance they had to call the language Moldovan, not Romanian, and to write it in Cyrillic, not Latin script.
The pitted road into town nevertheless seems in better shape than it did on my previous visit a year ago. There are freshly repainted houses, new cars, and bill-boards announcing new superstores. Much of this is apparently driven by remittances from Moldovans abroad, but whatever the origin, there is a sense of a buzz.
Speaking with my interlocutors ? a representative group of officials, regulators, with an academic and businessman thrown in ? it dawns on me again how much the EU actually has to offer. Interestingly, in terms of the gas and electricity markets, Moldova has already taken the necessary liberalisation measures to meet EU standards ? actually, it even did so last century. But in discussing the EU-Moldova Action Plan that is part of the recent Neighbourhood Policy, it becomes obvious that much more is at stake than the transposition of the Acquis Communautaire.
Breaking isolation
Moldova feels dependent on its neighbours good will ? certainly on energy (especially the gas that fuels its power stations) ? but also in many other ways. It may be the tenth largest wine producer in the world, but nobody in the West would know that: its products lack market access to the West, and hence are sold mostly to Eastern neighbours. Moreover, I hear the fears of how, once Romania joins the EU, travel will become more difficult, as many EU countries do not have Embassies in Chisinau, but service Moldova from Romania: hence they will need a visa for Romania to go and get a visa to travel on to another part of the EU, or will have to head to Kiev, which psychologically they feel pushes them back to old times.
Yet the EU is also a hope in breaking this isolation. On the energy front, the wires and pipelines all head East. There is currently no plan B if the gas pipes are turned off ? or more likely, if Russia hikes the prices substantially. The EUs push to link infrastructures, even electricity grids, is therefore a great opportunity for Moldova, if it can attach itself. Likewise something is moving on the psychological front. The EU action plans suddenly open a space for discussion of domestic policy. In putting what Europe does? on the table next to what has traditionally been done locally, there is a chance to argue more vigorously for alternatives, new options appear, indeed, there may be a possibility of addressing taboo subjects ? anything from corruption and organised crime through to subsidies.
Big helps small
Even more significantly, and to be honest, one of the only reasons Moldova figures on any priority lists in the EU, there is the Transnistria problem (even the way you spell the place shows a certain partisanship, as Trans-Dniester is Russian). This is a break-away enclave, run by some unsavoury individuals, and for a long time backed by the Russian army. Even if the Russian military presence has diminished compared to the days when it openly attacked Moldova in 1992 ? officially responding to fears that Moldova would seek to unite with Romania ? the arms have been taken over by the locals, who are principally of Russian and Ukrainian extraction in any case. As with all such territorial issues, there are long histories attached, and depending on which moment in time you take, a case can be made for one side or the other. But the problem for the EU today is that this part of Moldova has become a major hub for all the types of activity we do not wish to see happening. Drug and people trafficking, prostitution rings, arms production and smuggling, money laundering, not to mention repression of opposition in the local population.
The fact the problem has gone on unresolved for over thirteen years reflects internal and external problems. Justifiably Moldovans felt impotent faced with a superior military, and feared renewed Russian ? and even Ukrainian - involvement if things heated up again. Less justifiably, rumours are rife that some in Chisinau have also become rich from the activities on the other side of the River Nistru/Dniester. And from abroad, in the early 90s no West European country felt able to exert any influence on the situation.
Yet today, the situation could be different ? if we chose. The Ukraine has undergone its Orange revolution, and is less likely to follow Moscows line. Even some in Moscow have grown worried at the activities in the break away state, as arms produced there have a disturbing tendency to reappear in Russias own North Caucus territories. And then there is the European Union. Firstly, the Moldovan Government seems to have resolved that it wishes to face towards the EU, and hence wants to do something about the problem. Secondly, the European Union now claims to have Common Foreign and Security Policy.
On this last point, some anecdotal information is important. Locals claim that 80% of foreign? businesses operating in the breakaway region are from the EU, if one takes the EU as a whole. Moreover, they affirm that the EU lets in the products without checking if they have paid exited via the formal Moldovan customs route ? in other words, we unofficially recognise the regime in place as just as legitimate as the Moldovan government. One EU country could not do much. But block business with the EU as a whole, and overnight the break-away enclave would sink.
The EU has however, only started to realise the opportunity at hand. It is funding a project that will monitor the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (executed by the UNDP). It has encouraged Ukraine to help apply pressure (although there are also numerous Ukrainians in Transnistria). The EU and the USA will now be associated as observers in talks between the Government and break-away region. But can the EU raise the pressure enough ? As one observer I met wryly observed: the EU could buy Transnistria from Russia for a couple of hundred million Euro. But will it bother to try ? The Brits are busy doing their own thing still, just as are the Germans, the French, and the Poles. As for the rest, most of them simply do not care?.
Great Expectations
One of the aims of the neighbourhood policy was indeed to provide some of the power of attraction of the EU to others who maybe would not become members. But given the ever increasing size of the EUs political, economic, ecological and social footprint, the territory we impinge on grows constantly. Let us hope that our Member States do not let us down again by either pretending they can do it alone, or by putting their heads in the sand of domestic politics as usual.
In the case of Moldova, there will be two consequences if we do chose to do nothing. The first, which I knew before going to Chisinau, is the continued growth of crime and tools for terror inside the EU. The second, which I learnt in Moldova: it is that the Romanian Interior Minister recently estimated that 70% of Moldovas population is eligible for a Romanian passport, and that when Romania becomes an EU Member State?? Well, the rest you can work out for yourself.
Adrian Taylor, Newropeans
London (United Kingdom)
 |
