Eurasia Daily Monitor - Washington, DC, USA
By Vladimir Socor
OSCE plans emerge on Russian troops in Transnistria In the run-up to the OSCE's
year-end conference, which began yesterday, December 5, the organization's Moldova
Mission made public on November 29 in Chisinau the hitherto secret package of
force-reduction and confidence-building measures that Russia and the OSCE have
jointly authored and proposed to the Chisinau and Tiraspol authorities. The original
Russian text and English translation had officially been distributed at the OSCE
in Vienna as restricted documents in July; but the documents ultimately surfaced
in Chisinau, forcing the OSCE Mission to go public and defend the plan.
The plan would: a) allow Russian troops to remain indefinitely on Moldova's territory;
b) reduce, with the professed intent ultimately to abolish, the Moldovan and Transnistrian
forces; c) however, legalize the "Transnistrian" forces (in fact, Transnistria-flagged
Russian forces) for an open-ended transitional period, on a par with Moldova's
army; d) create a Russian-dominated mechanism of military inspection in right-bank
Moldova, while shielding left-bank Transnistria from effective international inspection
and verification; and e) invite Russia and the OSCE to train Moldovan-"Transnistrian"
joint peacekeeping troops, thus preempting similar offers to train Moldovan peacekeepers
by NATO member countries, as well as foiling Chisinau's intention to rid the country
of Russia's "peacekeeping" troops (see EDM, September 15).
Moldovan experts Nicolae Chirtoaca, a retired intelligence colonel who is director
of the Euro-Atlantic Center in Chisinau, and Iurie Pintea, a recently retired
Army Lt.-Colonel, Harvard School of Government graduate, and military analyst
for the Soros Foundation-supported Institute for Public Policies in Chisinau,
have published highly critical commentaries on the plan in the wake of the OSCE's
briefing. (Chirtoaca had also criticized the plan when it leaked in October.)
Their criticisms focus on the plan's questionable official motivations and dangerous
political ramifications.
The plan's chief official motivation is to prevent military conflict between
Moldova and Transnistria, on the stated assumption that both of those forces
are a potential source of conflict. The critics describe such an imputation
to Moldova as "sensational." No international organization or inspection
has ascribed such an intent or capability to Moldova, they note; to the contrary,
the international consensus [minus Russia] holds that Russian/Transnistrian
forces pose threats to security and stability. While Moldova's army is regularly
being inspected and found in compliance with international agreements on confidence
building and transparency, Russian/Transnistrian forces are not.
The Russia-OSCE plan purports to be based on the military aspects of the 1997
Dayton peace agreements for Bosnia and the 1999 Vienna Document on confidence
and security-building measures. However, these critics point out, those elements
are "torn out of their context" in the plan for Moldova. The West
implemented the "Dayton model" with local parties that accepted Western
arbitration and enforcement of the agreements. And the Vienna Document is an
international pact concluded among sovereign state-parties. None of those factors
and circumstances exists in Moldova, however. Here, "shockingly enough,"
the plan treats Transnistria de facto as if it were a sovereign state, and would
empower Russia as the main inspector and "guarantor." Thus, the critics
conclude, application of those "models" in Moldova would only result
in the recognition of Transnistria's secession.
While the OSCE would function alongside Russia as "guarantor" (with
Ukraine as another figurehead), "The OSCE has already demonstrated that
it has no influence on Tiraspol's authorities, it can only plead with them;
while Russia has equally demonstrated countless times that it can not be impartial,
so that its ‘guarantor role would rather guarantee perpetuation of the
conflict." Moreover, "these documents ignore the issue of [obtaining
the] withdrawal of Russian troops." (Moldova Azi, December 2). "If
we accept these proposals, we are left at Russia's discretion," Pintea
observes (Basapress, December 3).
The analysts also criticize the attempt to separate the military plan from
the political resolution of the conflict, whereby the plan outruns the political
negotiations. "This plan must imperatively be correlated to the political
settlement process. The foreign forces stationed in Moldova -- those of the
Russian Federation and Transnistria -- pose the most serious danger …
If Chisinau starts implementing the OSCE's plan, the ensuing developments would
only favor Russia and its secessionist protégés" (Basapress,
December 3). In an earlier analysis that had opened the series of critical comments,
Chirtoaca noted that the plan "seeks a unilateral demilitarization of Moldova
under the false pretext of disarming the ‘parties in conflict …
The real goal can not be more obvious: disarming Moldova while retaining Russia's
own military presence" (Moldova Suverana, October 19).
(Basapress, December 3; Moldova Azi, December 2; see EDM, September 15, November
22, 23, December 1, 2)
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